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Gatekeepers have existed in all historic periods of public 
communication, and defining their legal status has often caused 
problems for the law. Generally, newspaper kiosks, postal 
carriers, and cable and satellite providers were not considered to 
have a direct impact on the media content they made available to 
the public. A postal carrier or cable provider could deprive 
individual readers or viewers from accessing information by 
refusing to deliver a paper or fix a network error (thereby also 
hurting his or her own financial interests), but they are not in a 
position to decide on the content of newspaper articles or 
television programs. Such actors had limited potential to interfere 
with the communication process, even though they were 
indispensable parts of it, and this made them a tempting target 
for the government seeking to regulate, or at least keep within 
certain boundaries, the freedom of speech of others by regulating 
the intermediaries. 
Even though the internet seems to provide direct and 
unconditional access for persons wishing to exercise their freedom 
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of speech in public, gatekeepers still remain an indispensable part 
of the communication process. A gatekeeper is defined as a person 
or entity, the activity of whom is necessary for publishing the 
opinion of another person or entity, and they include ISPs, blog 
service providers, social media, search engine providers, entities 
selling apps, webstores, news portals, news aggregating sites, and 
the content providers of websites who can decide on the 
publication of comments to individual posts. Some gatekeepers 
may be influential or even indispensable, with a considerable 
impact on public communication, while other gatekeepers may 
have more limited powers and may even go unnoticed by the 
public. It is true of all gatekeepers that they are capable of 
influencing the public without being government actors, and that 
they are usually even more effective at influencing it than the 
government itself. As private entities, they are not bound by the 
Constitution to maintain First Amendment freedom of speech 
protections, so they can establish their own service rules 
concerning the freedom of speech. 
Natali Helberger and her co-authors identify two 
fundamental groups of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers of the first group 
control access to information directly, while gatekeepers of the 
second group control access to the important services that are 
needed to connect the user to various types of content.1 Members 
of the first group are similar to traditional editors, who decide on 
the content to be published, while members of the second group 
become gatekeepers as internet service providers (or cable 
providers in the context of television) due to the structure of the 
flow of information. 
For freedom of speech purposes, the most important online 
gatekeepers may belong to any of the following groups, depending 
on the activities they perform: Social media platforms, search 
engine platforms and application platforms. The latter two 
gatekeepers routinely make “editorial” decisions by making 
content unavailable, or deleting or removing it (either to comply 
with a legal obligation, to respect certain sensibilities, to protect 
their business interests or to act on their own discretion). As such 
 
 1 Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw & Rob van der Noll, 
Regulating the New Information Intermediaries as Gatekeepers of Information 
Diversity, 17 INFO: J. OF POL’Y, REG. AND STRATEGY FOR INFO. AND MEDIA 50, 52 (2015). 
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decisions have a direct impact on the flow of information, these 
gatekeepers belong to the first group. When the activities of such 
gatekeepers are related to sorting content, changing the focus 
among various pieces of content—that is, the “findability” of such 
content—or for creating a personalized offering for a user, they 
belong to the second group.2 
Thus, as Uta Kohl notes, the most important theoretical 
questions pertaining to the gatekeepers of the internet relate to 
whether they play an active or passive role in the communication 
process, the nature of their “editorial” activities, and the extent of 
the similarities between their editorial activities and actual 
editing.3 The role of gatekeepers covered in this volume is not 
passive. They are key actors of the democratic public sphere and 
actively involved in the communication process, including making 
decisions about what their users can access and what they cannot, 
or can access only with substantial difficulty. Under the current 
legal approach, gatekeepers are not considered as “media services” 
or “content providers.” This means that while they do demand 
protection for the freedom of speech in order to enable their 
selection activities, they are not bound by the various legal 
guarantees concerning the right of individuals to access the 
media,4 and they are not subject to obligations that are otherwise 
applicable to the media as a private institution of constitutional 
value,5 as it is conceptualized in the European legal approach.6 
I. THE REGULATION OF SEARCH ENGINES 
Online search engines typically perform the following three 
main activities: (1) Collect information available on the internet 
using automated programs that follow links to jump from site to 
 
 2 Id. at 53-54. 
 3 Uta Kohl, Intermediaries within Online Regulation, in INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY LAW 85-87 (Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl & Andrew Charlesworth eds., 5th 
ed., Routledge 2016). 
 4 See generally RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA (András Sajó & Monroe Price 
eds., Kluwer Law International 1996). 
 5 William J. Brennan, Jr., Address 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979). 
 6 WILLIAM E. BERRY ET AL., LAST RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR THEORIES OF THE 
PRESS 77-100 (John C. Nerone ed., Univ. of Illinois Press 1995); see generally, COMM’N 
ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (Robert D. Leigh ed., 
Univ. of Chicago Press 1947). 
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site (crawling); (2) analyze the collected data, assign various 
metadata, and build indexes that help to find individual sites later 
on, and (3) use these indexes to select and present users with 
pages, ranked on the basis of the available metadata, that meet 
user-specified query criteria in response to searches run by users 
by entering a keyword or expression.7 
Finding information on the internet would be considerably 
more complicated without search engines. Most users use search 
engines every day as a matter of course. For all practical purposes, 
a piece of content not indexed by a search engine does not really 
exist.8 As such, search engines can be considered as media, as the 
information available through them has a fundamental influence 
on the opinions of users.9 However, by their nature, they are also 
different from traditional media; search engines are not the 
authors or publishers of the content they index and present to 
users but instead typically collect and rank the contents of others. 
Nonetheless, this activity can be considered to be protected by 
freedom of speech. Joris van Hoboken argues that search engines 
constitute a “meta-medium,” because they collect and organize the 
content of others, but the product of their activities—the search 
results or rankings displayed in response to a search query—can 
also be regarded as their own independent content.10 
The implications of search engines for the protection of 
human rights are reflected in the recommendations of the Council 
of Europe. Its 2012 recommendation on the protection of human 
rights with regard to search engines notes that search engines 
enable the public to search for, receive, and transmit information 
online.11 However, the rights of individuals, especially the right to 
 
 7 Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine 
Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1636 (2014). 
 8 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, 
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1164 (2008). 
 9 EMILY LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 178 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2015). 
 10 JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, SEARCH ENGINE FREEDOM 189 (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 11 Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 of 
the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of human rights with 
regard to search engines, ¶ 7, 1139th Sess. (2012) https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result
_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805caa87 [https://perma.cc/6UEA-M4DC]. 
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privacy and the protection of personal data, may also be violated 
by search engine services.12 
In addition to the protection of these rights, other important 
criteria include guaranteeing access to the service, the diversity of 
the service and the unbiased treatment of pieces of content. 
Accordingly, the recommendation calls for increasing 
transparency regarding search results (e.g., what pieces of content 
are considered as hits by the service and why, and what is the 
reason behind the ranking of hits) with a view to ensuring the 
plurality and diversity of the presented content.13 Furthermore, 
the recommendation also invites service providers not to make 
any piece of content unavailable through their service unless they 
do so on the basis of a ground for limiting the freedom of 
expression set forth in Article 10(2) of the ECtHR.14 Alas, the 
current regulatory framework permits search engine providers to 
be invited, but not obliged, to show this kind of respect for freedom 
of expression. 
As Nico van Eijk notes, search engines operate in a legal 
vacuum because they are a mixture of telecommunications and 
content services and do not fall into either of these two categories, 
or possibly they fall into both at the same time.15 In the context of 
European law, this duality is also present in the E-commerce 
Directive, under which search engines are considered information 
society services, but they are not subject to the liability and 
exemption rules laid down in Articles 12 to 14 (concerning mere 
conduit, caching and hosting). 
This means that the application of the notice and takedown 
procedure to search engines is not mandatory in the Member 
States under the Directive, either. However, the European Court 
of Justice established in its ruling in Google France, by applying 
Article 14, that certain services provided by search engines (e.g., 
storing the data and messages of advertisers in relation to 
sponsored links) could be considered hosting services.16 The notice 
 
 12 Id. ¶ 4. 
 13 Id. ¶ 7. 
 14 Id. ¶ 8. 
 15 Nico van Eijk, Search Engines: Seek and Ye Shall Find? The Position of Search 
Engines in Law, IRIS PLUS, at 7 (2006) (Eur.). 
 16 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton 
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 111. 
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and takedown procedure, which makes the liability of a service 
provider dependent on the actions it takes after it becomes aware 
of a violation, can be applied where those data are illegal.17 
However, this approach cannot be extended to organic search 
results in general. 
European states may draw various conclusions from this 
situation. They can: (1) impose obligations on search engines by 
applying general legislation to take action against illegal content, 
regardless of the provisions of the E-commerce Directive; (2) apply 
the notice and takedown procedure described in Article 14 to 
search engines; (3) extend the scope of the liability rules laid down 
in Articles 12 and 13 to search engines, which afford greater 
protection to search engines and also permit the application of 
interim injunctions regarding illegal content; (4) afford absolute 
immunity to search engines; or (5) create special rules introducing 
a regulatory framework that is even stricter than the provisions of 
the directive. An overview of the solutions applied in Europe 
indicates that options (1) to (3) are commonly applied, while 
options (4) and (5)—the introduction of more stringent rules 
concerning search engines, or affording them absolute immunity—
are not applied at all.18 
In addition to resolving the problem of taking action against 
illegal content in general, search engines are often required to 
make certain links unavailable in their system if they violate 
personality rights, personal data, or are used to commit a criminal 
offence.19 The United Kingdom introduced a dedicated framework 
regulating the liability of website operators for defamatory 
statements as a supplement to the general legal provisions on 
defamation and the rules of common law.20 
It is doubtless that the most effective means of regulating 
search engines is self-regulation, which is already used by Google 
in connection with numerous subjects that could be dangerous or 
harmful to users (e.g., pornography and violence). These rules are 
 
 17 Id. ¶ 120. 
 18 Uta Kohl, Google: The rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of 
the internet and beyond (Part 2), 21 INT’L J. OF L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 201 (2013); VAN 
HOBOKEN, supra note 10, at 252-56. 
 19 Concerning criminal offences, see Kohl, supra note 18, at 228-30; concerning 
personality rights, see Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26 § 5 (U.K.). 
 20 Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26 § 5 (U.K.). 
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far more restrictive than the constitutionally permitted 
limitations to the freedom of speech.21 
In the U.S., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
affords broad immunity to search engines against legal liability 
for illegal content that is accessible through their services. 
However, copyright legislation requires search engines to apply 
notice and takedown procedures.22 
In autocratic countries, the introduction of strict rules 
concerning search engines is one of the most effective means of 
keeping undesirable opinions from public access. If the activities 
of search engines were protected by the freedom of speech 
(meaning in this context the legal corpus originating from the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution), it would not be 
possible to object to such practices if they were applied, for 
example, by the state-owned search engine of China.23 However, 
internal “private censorship” is not fully consistent with the 
European idea of freedom of expression, and private parties can 
also be expected under legal regulations to serve and support 
democratic public life. 
II. PRIVACY AND SEARCH ENGINES: THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN 
Even before the emergence of the internet, the law had 
recognized and afforded protection to the legitimate interest of 
persons in disappearing from the public sphere and making 
previously published information inaccessible. The perpetrators of 
criminal offences, for instance, are absolved of the detrimental 
consequences of their punishment after they serve their sentence, 
meaning that they may not be confronted with the crimes they 
 
 21 See VAN HOBOKEN, supra note 10, at 237, 245. 
 22 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105, 304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (requiring 
“notification” and “expeditious[]” removal). 
 23 See Zhang v Baidu.com, 932 F. Supp. 2d 561, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding, in 
part, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to address whether the People’s 
Republic of China properly refused to effect service pursuant to Hague Convention on 
the ground that doing so would infringe its sovereignty or security, in plaintiffs’ suit 
alleging that China and a Chinese Internet search engine service provider conspired to 
prevent their political speech, in violation of American federal, state, and municipal 
law). 
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committed earlier, and they may even start a new life by changing 
their identity in justified cases.24 In some European jurisdictions, 
the veracity of a statement may not be proven in criminal 
proceedings launched for defamation, unless there is a public 
interest (e.g., taking a position in a public debate) or a 
considerable private interest in the publication of that 
information. In the absence of such an interest, even statements 
that are in fact true can be considered defamatory, meaning that 
they result in the truth being forgotten.25 Privacy, an important 
aspect of the protection of personality, is afforded protection 
through the rules of liability for damages and the provisions of 
private law, and it can also be used under certain circumstances to 
prevent the publication of otherwise true statements. 
The protection of personal data is also relevant in this 
context. The EU Directive on the protection of personal data26 
(since repealed) provided that personal data processed by a 
controller must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” 
regarding the further processing of such data,27 while they must 
also be accurate and, if necessary, up-to-date.28 The data subject 
must be permitted to request from the controller the rectification, 
erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not 
comply with the provisions of the directive.29 While it caused 
considerable excitement at its time, the Google Spain case30 did 
not introduce much novelty in terms of possibly affording any 
additional right to persons who are concerned about their personal 
data, though it was certainly novel in that the European Court of 
Justice held that the obligations laid down in the Directive could 
also be extended to search engine operators. 
 
 24 See X (a woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v. O’Brien, [2003] EWHC 1101 [¶ 
1] (QB); Carr v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2005] EWHC 971 [¶¶ 1, 3] (QB). 
 25 See, e.g., Code Criminal [C. Crim.] art. 270 (Den.); 2012 Büntető Törvénykönyv 
[BTK.] § 229 (Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code § 229) (Hung.); 
Tryckfrihetsfördningen [TF] [Constitution] 7:14(14) (Swed.). 
 26 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
 27 Id. at art. 6(c). 
 28 Id. at art. 6(d). 
 29 Id. at art. 12(b). 
 30 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEDP), 2014 E.C.R. 317 (Spain). 
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According to the European Court of Justice, the activities of 
search engines constitute data processing for the purpose of 
Article 2(b) of the Directive, as: 
the operator of a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it 
subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the 
framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers 
and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its 
users in the form of lists of search results.31 
Its activities are, however, different from those of a publisher 
of websites, the activities of which are involved in a search.32 
Search engines play a decisive role in the global dissemination of 
data and information, considering that some users would be 
unable to find a given piece of information without them.33 This 
means that the activities of a search engine “have an additional 
effect” to the activities of the publishers of websites, and they are 
capable of having a considerable impact on the rights relating to 
the protection of privacy and personal data.34 A search engine does 
not simply facilitate access to information; it also “may play a 
decisive role in the dissemination of that information, [and] it is 
liable to constitute a more significant interference with the data 
subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the publication on the 
web page.”35As such, a search engine may be required to render 
personal data in its possession inaccessible, meaning that it would 
be removed from the list of search results, but it would remain 
available at its original location (i.e., on the relevant website). 
However, a search engine may not be required to delete such data: 
if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played 
by the data subject in public life, that the interference with 
his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant 
interest of the general public in having, on account of 
 
 31 Id. ¶ 28 (translated to English). 
 32 Id. ¶¶ 35, 83. 
 33 Id. ¶ 36. 
 34 Id. ¶¶ 38, 83 (translated to English). 
 35 Id. ¶ 87 (translated to English). 
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inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in 
question.36 
This means that the freedom to discuss public affairs is a 
limitation of the right to the protection of personal data. The 
decision caused considerable excitement and triggered a lively 
debate, as it gave rise to extensive commentaries in legal 
literature almost immediately upon its being passed.37 
An interesting detail of the case is that Mario Costeja decided 
to request that a search engine render its links inaccessible, 
instead of acting against the newspapers that featured the 
original 1998 article (pertaining to his old social insurance debt 
and the forced auction of his property) in their online archives. 
This fact is telling about the role Google plays in public life. 
Online archives are far less frequently consulted and, as Filippo 
Fontanelli points out, Costeja would not have bothered to act if 
Google had featured the article concerned on the twenty-third 
page of its list of search results.38 However, a legal procedure was 
initiated as the article was featured by Google’s algorithm in a 
prominent place, thereby making the information about the 
plaintiff easily accessible. 
Irini Katsirea is concerned that the logic behind this decision 
might snowball, possibly affecting online press archives as well, 
since the limits of the right to be forgotten seem to be vague.39 It 
certainly seems to be the case that the court failed to make a clear 
distinction between archives and the search rankings of a search 
engine, and the judgment itself does not offer many possible 
defences against a possible request to delete “irrelevant” or 
“outdated” data from online archives as well. Dr. Jan Oster also 
pointed out that the decision does not say much on issues relating 
 
 36 Id. ¶ 97. 
 37 See David Lindsay, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ by Search Engines under Data 
Privacy Law: A Legal Analysis of the Costeja Ruling, 6 J. MEDIA L. 159 (2014). 
 38 Filippo Fontanelli, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the illusion of 
balancing in internet-related disputes, in THE INTERNET AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 
(Oreste Pollicino & Graziella Romeo eds., Routledge 2016). 
 39 See Irini Katsirea, Search Engines and Press Archives between Memory and 
Oblivion, 24 EUR. PUB. L. 125 (2018). 
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to the freedom of speech (the interests of the public are mentioned 
in the part quoted above).40 
Article 9 of the Directive enabled Member States to grant 
exemptions from the obligations pertaining to the protection of 
personal data for the processing of such data for “journalistic 
purposes”: 
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations 
from the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter 
VI for the processing of personal data carried out solely for 
journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to 
privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.41 
However, this provision merely offered a possibility to 
Member States, and did not impose any obligation to do so. It is 
also apparent from the approach taken by the European Court of 
Justice that the data processing carried out by Google is not 
considered similar or analogous to journalistic activities.42 
The justification for just this distinction is vehemently 
challenged by Robert Post.43 While it seems clear that a search 
engine makes personal data, among other data, more easily 
accessible, it is not clear why its activities should be regarded with 
more stringency than the activities of a press archive, taking into 
account that, at the end of the day, the publication of the 
information is a result of the activities of the latter.44 However, 
this is not the main concern raised by Post: He argues that Google 
is an indispensable actor in the infrastructure of communications, 
and it is absolutely necessary to maintain a vibrant public 
sphere.45 Google serves the same public interests as journalism or 
the media in general,46 and its activities are similar to newspapers 
 
 40 Jan Oster, Communication, defamation and liability of intermediaries, 35 LEGAL 
STUDIES 348, 355-57 (2015) (U.K.); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 41 Council Directive 95/46, art. 9, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
 42 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEDP), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 85 (Spain). 
 43 See generally Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the 
Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981 
(2018). 
 44 Id. at 1010. 
 45 Id. at 1016. 
 46 Id. at 1041-43. 
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in that it serves the public and shapes democratic public opinions. 
The press plays the same role, with the difference that it 
publishes the views and opinions of journalists and editors. While 
this does not apply to a search engine, Post argues that this is an 
insignificant difference, as the point is that they both convey 
information to the public (users), which makes the press and 
search engines highly similar to each other.47 
The available case law on search engines and the right to be 
forgotten took off shortly after the decision was passed.48 It is 
hardly a surprise that one of the main difficulties resulting from 
the judgement is the weighing of interests required under the 
judgement. One difficulty, for example, is the weighing of interests 
in keeping processing the given piece of information, for the 
purposes of discussing public affairs openly, against the interests 
in discarding irrelevant or outdated information. Common law 
countries have also faced the problem of assessing and weighing 
the status of the applicant, his or her role in public life at the time 
of the affair, and the significance of the public interest in 
preserving a given piece of information.49 In NT1 & NT2, the court 
had to answer the question whether the right to be forgotten was 
applicable in cases involving spent criminal convictions. According 
to Justice Warby, NT1’s claims were unfounded as the claimant 
failed to satisfy the criteria established in Google Spain.50 In the 
case of NT2, the information available through Google had become 
“irrelevant and of no sufficient legitimate interest to users of 
Google Search to justify its continued availability, so that an 
appropriate delisting order should be made.”51 
In ML & WW v. Germany,52 the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) held that Article 8 of the Convention was not 
 
 47 Id. at 1042-43. 




 49 See, e.g., NT1 & NT2 v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB); see also Róisin A. 
Costello, The Right to Be Forgotten in Cases Involving Criminal Convictions, 3 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 268 (2018). 
 50 NT1 & NT2 v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 [¶ 170] (QB); 
 51 Id. [¶ 223]. 
 52 See M.L. & W.W. v. Germany, No. 60798/10 & 65599/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 
(2018). 
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violated by the respondent state. The facts of the case were similar 
to NT1 & NT2’s, as the publications by the media concerned a 
murder conviction. But this was not a case against search engines: 
The articles appeared in search engine results but the applicants 
did not make applications in Germany for search engine 
delisting. However, the decision confirmed the theoretical 
availability of an Article 8 claim against search engines as well.53 
The ECHR emphasized that the balance of interests may lead to 
different results depending on whether an individual directs her 
request for erasure to a search engine operator or primary 
publisher.54 
Essentially, the decision of the European Court of Justice in 
Google Spain forced search engines to assume the role of an editor 
(a somewhat inverted version of the editor’s role), as they do not 
decide on the publication but on the removal of information, and 
their decision applies to their own system only, even though it is 
usually indispensable for finding old information. While Google 
had already been carrying out similar editorial tasks (filtering and 
ranking content to be presented to users), it had been doing so at 
its own initiative and in the service of its own economic interests. 
However, now it is required to do so by law, similarly to the 
situation of autocomplete search suggestions. 
The scope of Google Spain was limited to the Spanish version 
of the search engine (.es domain) as the Spanish authorities 
believed that their jurisdiction was limited to that scope. However, 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Equustek required Google to 
perform the removal of links concerning all of its domains, 
considering that the right to the protection of intellectual property 
could not be enforced in any other way, for example by removing 
such links from the .ca domain only.55 Though Equustek was an 
intellectual property case, it may have some consequences also for 
 
 53 See Hugh Tomlinson QC & Aidan Wills, Case Law, Strasbourg: ML and WW v 
Germany, Article 8 right to be forgotten and the media, THE INT’L F. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
MEDIA BLOG (July 4, 2018), https://inforrm.org/2018/07/04/case-law-strasbourg-ml-and-
ww-v-germany-article-8-right-to-be-forgotten-and-the-media-hugh-tomlinson-qc-and-
aidan-wills/ [https://perma.cc/93FE-V8NB]. 
 54 M.L. & W.W. v. Germany, No. 60798/10 & 65599/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 97 (2018). 
 55 Google Inc. v Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 827 (Can.); see 
generally Michael Douglas, A Global Injunction Against Google, 134 L. Q. REV. 181 
(2018) (Austl.). 
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the future of the right to forgotten. According to Ronald 
Krotoszynski, “[it] seems highly likely that a similar kind of 
analysis could be brought to bear in right to be forgotten cases . . . 
that involve domestic court orders that require the de-indexing of 
content not only within the issuing court’s territory. . . .”56 
According to him, in the context of the right to be forgotten, this 
approach would limit the citizens of a country only to the 
information that the domestic court of another country deems 
appropriate. The issue of the scope of removal will also be faced by 
the European Court of Justice, as its preliminary ruling on the 
matter has been sought in a French case.57 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted by 
the EU and replacing the previous Directive introduced 
considerable changes regarding the right to be forgotten.58 First, it 
is significant that the Regulation is directly applicable in each 
Member State, thus the same provisions are to be applied with the 
same wording as adopted by the EU. Second, the right to be 
forgotten is mentioned by exactly this name in the regulation (and 
as a synonym for the right to erasure). Third, the Regulation seeks 
to afford greater protection to the freedom of expression, by 
providing that this right may not be exercised where “processing 
is necessary . . . for exercising the right of freedom of expression 
and information.”59 The recognition of this exception is not merely 
an option but an obligation for each Member State. The vague 
phrase “journalistic purposes” mentioned in the Directive has now 
been replaced by the protection of the freedom of speech and the 
right to information, although only the latter is mentioned in the 
 
 56 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Privacy, Remedies, and Comity: The Emerging Problem 
of Global Injunctions, COMPARATIVE PRIVACY AND DEFAMATION (forthcoming July 
2020) (manuscript at 22) (on file with author). 




 58 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/
reg/2016/679/oj [hereinafter GDPR] [https://perma.cc/3Z7L-AG68]. 
 59 GDPR, art. 17(3)(a). 
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preamble, along with audiovisual and news archives.60 The GDPR 
seeks to maintain the obligation of search engines to respect the 
right to be forgotten, even though the text of the regulation in fact 
reinforces the arguments for their exemption: a search engine is 
certainly capable of serving both the freedom of expression and 
the right to information. 
Furthermore, the Regulation focuses on the exercise of such 
rights and indicates where there are exceptions from their 
exercise, so that these exceptions do not necessarily mean the 
exercise of any right by a service provider but may apply to users 
as well. This means that, when considering the situation while 
bearing in mind the interests of users, a search engine might even 
be exempted from its erasure obligation, regardless of whether or 
not a search result is recognized as a form of free expression by 
the search engine. However, this observation would not apply if 
irrelevant or outdated pieces of information are not considered to 
be necessary for the exercise of the freedom of expression or the 
right to information. 
Thus, the criticism offered by Post also remains relevant in 
the context of the GDPR, although it should be noted that if 
search engines were considered to be media-like services, as he 
suggests, it would be an unequivocally welcome change for search 
engines under the law of the First Amendment. Following such an 
approach in Europe, however, would mean that the public interest 
obligations of the media would also apply to search engines, 
including the requirement of diversity in content, the right to 
reply for anyone attacked through false factual allegations in the 
media, and the protection of the audience from harmful content. 
The situation is ambiguous: on the one hand, the right to be 
forgotten requires search engines to fulfil a kind of editorial role, 
while on the other hand, the performance of this task is in part 
why search engines cannot be considered as media, and, as a key 
conceptual component of media services, become an actual “editor” 
in the legal sense of the term. 
The U.S. legal system would not be comfortable with 
recognizing a general right to be forgotten, and Section 230 of the 
CDA also excludes any kind of liability on the part of search 
 
 60 GDPR, recital 153. 
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engines in this respect.61 Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that 
certain rights akin to the right to be forgotten might exist in 
certain limited fields of the law, for example under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act requiring the erasure of financial data,62 a 
Californian statute allowing minors to request the subsequent 
erasure of data they published online concerning themselves,63 
and other similar provisions and drafts.64 
III. THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
Social media platforms have become the primary arena of 
online public life, but there is no generally accepted definition for 
such platforms (also known as social networks). For the purposes 
of this part, social media platforms also include video sharing 
portals, where users can upload publicly available content, as well 
as platforms where user-generated content (including videos, 
texts, images, links, etc.) is made available to, and then shared by, 
an audience selected by the user. This part applies the same 
approach towards YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. The main 
reason for doing so is that, from a freedom of speech perspective, 
the activities of these platforms are quite similar and can be 
examined using similar methods. Each of these services is capable 
of restricting user-generated content, and they are even legally 
required to do so from time to time. The Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive65 of the EU has introduced common rules for 
these two different services—the scope of the directive extends to 
audiovisual content that is present on both video sharing 
platforms and social media platforms.66 
 
 61 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
 62 See Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 
530-31 (2015). 
 63 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. § 22581 (West 2020). 
 64 Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different Paradigms 
of the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 331-33 (2014). 
 65 Directive 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive) in the view of changing market realities, 2018 O.J. (L 303/69), ¶¶ 4, 5 
[hereinafter New AVMS Directive]. 
 66 See FRANCISCO J. CABRERA BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR VIDEO-
SHARING PLATFORMS, IRIS PLUS (2018). 
2020] PRIVACY AND ONLINE GATEKEEPERS 635 
The matter of legal liability of such platforms raises complex 
issues. A platform per se is not the primary communicator of a 
harmful opinion, as it only enables others to speak, and sorts and 
displays such content to other users. The European legal approach 
dictates that social media platforms must play an active role in 
the removal of violating content and that they may held be liable 
if they fail to do so.67 As such, government regulation involves 
platform service providers in remedying various violations so that 
such providers are obliged to decide on the lawfulness of the 
content concerned. In other words, the task of enforcing the law is 
shared between the government (courts) and private actors.68 A 
rather limited version of the same model is also used in the US, 
under the aegis of the authorization granted in Section 230 of the 
CDA. In this way, platform providers become both media 
companies that decide on the permissibility of content and 
participants in applying and enforcing the law.69 While courts 
naturally play a considerable role in deciding social media related 
issues that are relevant to the freedom of speech, the moderators 
and legal counsels of these platforms have a far greater influence 
on the freedom of discussions and exchanges on the platform than 
the dedicated government apparatus does.70 
Under EU law, social media platforms are considered to be 
hosting service providers, as the users of such services store, sort 
and make available their own content in and through the system. 
This means that, pursuant to the E-commerce Directive, the 
platforms are required to remove any violating content after they 
become aware of its infringing nature, but they may not be subject 
to any general monitoring and control obligation.71 In an Austrian 
case (which is currently pending, as a preliminary ruling by the 
 
 67 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), 2000 O.J. (L 
178), art. 14 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. 
 68 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1179 
(2018). 
 69 Id. at 1180-81. 
 70 Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age 
of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2261-63 (2014). 
 71 E-Commerce Directive, arts. 14, 15. 
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European Court of Justice has been sought), certain issues were 
raised concerning the extent of the obligation of removal in the 
context of Facebook’s activities. Briefly, the question is whether a 
platform may be required under Article 14 of the Directive to 
remove not only a specifically identified piece of content, but also 
all other identical and even “similar” content that might be made 
available in the future. Would such a requirement be inconsistent 
with the Directive’s prohibition on introducing any monitoring 
obligation?72 
The proposal of the Austrian court seems reasonable, 
considering that this particular remedy could be rendered obsolete 
and useless by the prompt spread and reproduction of harmful 
content, if a platform were required to remove only specifically 
identified pieces of content without any such extension. In 
addition to the E-commerce Directive, more general pieces of 
legislation also apply to communications through social media 
platforms, including legislation on data protection, copyright, 
personality rights, public order, and criminal law. Such legal 
provisions may also introduce further obligations on hosting 
service providers in the context of removing violating content. 
Offline restrictions of speech are also applicable to 
communications through social media platforms.73 Common 
violating behaviors in social media can be fitted into more 
traditional criminal categories (i.e., those that were adopted in the 
context of the offline world) almost without exception, making the 
introduction of new prohibitions unnecessary.74 However, this 
duality gives rise to numerous difficulties as, on the one hand, 
such limitations are defined as part of the national legislation of 
each and every country (and the law of free speech is also far from 
being fully harmonized among EU Member States) while, on the 
other hand, social media is of its essence a global phenomenon, 
meaning that it transcends national borders. For example, an 
opinion that is protected by the freedom of speech in Europe might 
 
 72 OGH, Oct. 25, 2017, 6 Ob 116/17b, (2017) (Austria). 
 73 Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital 
Speech, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 357-66 (2012). 
 74 SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND CRIMINAL 
OFFENCES, 2014-5, HL 37 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/
ldselect/ldcomuni/37/37.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GP8-MN5A]. 
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constitute punishable blasphemy in an Islamic country. Since 
harmful content can be made available worldwide and is spread 
and multiplied on a social media platform quickly, the absence of a 
uniform standard leads to tension and violence.75 
As social media platforms spread, it became clear, about a 
decade after the previous amendment of the directive, that media 
regulation cannot be interpreted in such a restrictive manner any 
longer. A proposal for the amendment of the AVMS Directive 
published in May 2016 introduced the terms “video-sharing 
platform service” and “video-sharing platform provider.”76 
According to the amendment eventually adopted in November 
2018, the material scope of the Directive was extended to cover 
such services. 
Even though the original proposal would not have extended 
the scope of the Directive to social media platforms (in terms of 
the audiovisual content uploaded to the site), it became clear 
during the legislative process that they could not be exempted 
from the Directive, and it could not focus solely on portals used to 
share videos (e.g., YouTube).77 This means that, despite their 
somewhat misleading name, video-sharing platforms include 
audiovisual content published on social media. An important 
aspect of the newly-defined term is that service providers do not 
bear any editorial responsibility for such content; although service 
providers do sort, display, label, and organize such content as part 
of their activities, they do not become media service providers. 
Article 28(b) of the amended Directive provides that Articles 
12 to 15 of the E-commerce Directive (in particular the provisions 
on hosting service providers and the prohibition of introducing a 
general monitoring obligation) remain applicable. Member States 
 
 75 See Uta Kohl, Islamophobia, “Gross Offensiveness” and the Internet, 27 INFO. & 
COMM. TECH. L. 111 (2018). 
 76 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities., COM (2016) 287 final 
(May 25, 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:5201
6PC0287&from=EN [https://perma.cc/86N7-BKJ4]. 
 77 Duncan Robinson, Social networks face tougher EU oversight on video content, 
FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d5746e06-3fd7-11e7-82b6-
896b95f30f58 [https://perma.cc/W34T-S8RM]. 
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must ensure that video-sharing platform providers operating 
within their respective jurisdiction take appropriate measures to 
ensure: 
- the protection of minors from programmes, user-
generated videos and audiovisual commercial 
communications which may impair their physical, mental or 
moral development; 
- the protection of the general public from programmes, 
user-generated videos and audiovisual commercial 
communications containing incitement to violence or hatred 
directed against a group of persons or a member of a group; 
- the protection of the general public from programmes, 
user-generated videos and audiovisual commercial 
communications containing content the dissemination of 
which constitutes an activity which is a criminal offence 
under Union law, namely public provocation to commit a 
terrorist offence within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 
(EU) 2017/541, offences concerning child pornography within 
the meaning of Article 5(4) of Directive 2011/93/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, and offences 
concerning racism and xenophobia within the meaning of 
Article 1 of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA; 
- compliance with the requirements set out in Article 9(1) 
with respect to audiovisual commercial communications that 
are marketed, sold or arranged by the video-sharing platform 
providers (general restrictions of commercial communications 
and provisions in order to safeguard minors from 
commercials).78 
What constitutes an “appropriate measure” is to be 
determined with regard to the nature of the content in question, 
the harm it may cause and the characteristics of the category of 
persons to be protected, as well as the rights and legitimate 
interests at stake. These interests include those of the video-
sharing platform providers and of the users who created, 
 
 78 New AVMS Directive, supra note 65. 
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transmitted, and/or uploaded the content, as well as the public 
interest.79 
The legal situation is somewhat simpler in the U.S., as 
Section 230 of the CDA also protects social media platforms 
against government interference.80 If a platform only provides the 
facilities needed to upload content, it cannot be held responsible 
for the possibly infringing nature of that content, even if it 
encourages users to speak and sorts user content.81 However, if a 
platform controls, generates, actively edits, or modifies such 
content, it loses its immunity.82 The scope of exceptions from this 
rule can also be extended, as happened in April 2018, when a 
recently adopted law permitted taking action against websites, 
including hosting service providers, promoting trafficking in 
human beings for sexual exploitation.83 
IV. PRIVACY AND SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
Freedom of opinion means that people are free to form their 
own convictions and hold their own opinions on the basis of the 
information available. It follows that this freedom is also related 
to the protection of private life, freedom of religious beliefs and the 
freedom of speech. However, social media platforms tend to ignore 
this aspect of privacy. The business model of such platforms is 
based on the targeted display of advertisements, and they need to 
know their users to fulfil this goal. Knowing their users means, on 
the one hand, knowing the information users share and publish, 
 
 79 Id. art. 28b(3). 
 80 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
 81 Claire Ballentine, Yelp Can’t Be Ordered to Remove Negative Posts, California 
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/
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 82 Tom Jackman & Jonathan O’Connell, Backpage has always claimed it doesn’t 
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so that their profile can be charted for targeted marketing, and, on 
the other hand, knowing (or at least guessing) the ideas users do 
not speak of or do not even have at the time. This is how 
advertisements—which suggest what to buy, which hotel to book 
or which website to visit—become shown to users. 
The opinions of users can not only be guessed, but they can 
also be influenced and directed by suggestions. Users may be able 
to control such suggestions through their free will, but their 
freedom to decide for themselves is clearly restricted. The more 
information is available on a given user, the more detailed a 
profile is built up by a platform, and the more targeted the 
advertisements shown to him are, and consequently the more 
restricted that freedom becomes.84 It seems particularly 
worrisome that data collection may also extend to opinions that 
are not communicated and which exist only as thoughts—as 
happens when the analysis of messages never sent and content 
never posted is also used to develop the profile of a user.85 This 
means that not even the content of unsent messages remains 
secret, as it would otherwise remain in the offline world. 
Nonetheless, most users permit platform providers to process 
their personal data without being particularly concerned, in 
exchange for a high-quality personalized service. This 
phenomenon raises fundamental questions regarding the future of 
privacy protection and the practicality of its basic principles.86 
Measures to protect privacy, various torts, and the provisions 
of a civil code may be applied in the context of disputes among 
social media users. Such means and measures must be applied 
with due regard to and in line with the values of free speech and 
the open discussion of public affairs.87 Privacy concerns and 
 
 84 Susie Alegre, Rethinking Freedom of Thought for the 21st Century, EUR. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 221, 226-27 (2017). 
 85 See Sauvik Das & Adam Kramer, Self-Censorship on Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS 
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 86 See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Future of Privacy, PEW RES. CTR., (Dec. 
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2020] PRIVACY AND ONLINE GATEKEEPERS 641 
violations by social media platforms are not covered here, as they 
are only indirectly related to free speech issues. Platforms do not 
publish the data they collect on their users, but such information 
is used subsequently to determine the content (e.g., Facebook 
news feed) provided to each user concerned. If such content is 
considered the “opinion” of the platform, it becomes clear that free 
speech issues can be closely related to various privacy issues.88 
It is difficult for social media platforms to decide what to do 
with information uploaded by their users after their death. The 
right to privacy dictates that the photographs, messages and other 
content of a deceased person are to be protected, even against any 
next of kin, but this consideration is often in conflict with the 
family members’ right to respect for the deceased. To date, this 
conflict seems irresolvable at the level of principles.89 
The notice-and-takedown procedure laid down in the E-
commerce Directive is a specific area where the liability of a 
platform for a privacy violation may have a direct impact on free 
speech. Generally, the procedure is conducted in a similar way to 
the removal of any other infringing content, meaning that the 
platform is required to decide on the permissibility of a specific 
piece of content if it receives a privacy violation notice.90 This 
means that the platform has to play the roles of both editor and 
judge; it has to decide on whether to remove a piece of content or 
keep it accessible, thereby also passing a decision on its 
permissibility. This form of regulation raises some obvious 
concerns. If a platform decides not to remove a piece of allegedly 
violating content, the claimant may sue the platform as well as its 
author. 
For example, a dispute between private parties turned into a 
dispute between a platform and a private individual in CG v. 
 
 88 See Case C-210/16, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-
Holstein v. Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, 2018 E.C.R. 388 (The 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice holding that both the platform and 
the administrators of a fan page are liable for the privacy violations committed by 
Facebook concerning user data managed by the fan page operators on Facebook.). 
 89 See Damien McCallig, Facebook after death: an evolving policy in a social 
network, 22 INT’L J. OF L. & INFO. TECH. 107 (2014); Bo Zhao, Posthumous Defamation 
and Posthumous Privacy Cases in the Digital Age, 3 SAVANNAH L. REV. 15, 16-17 
(2016). 
 90 E-Commerce Directive, supra note 67, art. 14. 
642 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 89:4 
Facebook Ireland Ltd. in Northern Ireland.91 A Facebook user set 
up two sites on the platform where he published the personal data 
of persons convicted of committing pedophile offences (sex crimes 
against children). A photograph and the home address of the 
claimant (referred to by the abbreviation “CG” in the case 
documents) were also displayed next to an exchange. The claimant 
had indeed been convicted of a pedophile offence, but he had 
served his sentence, had been released, and was not considered a 
threat to society any more by public authorities. 
However, he was harassed and received threats against his 
life because of the Facebook page. The communication concerning 
the claimant was considered a clear misuse of private information, 
but Facebook refused to remove the information after receipt of a 
notice on the grounds that the notice was not submitted in the 
required form (it had been sent by post instead of using Facebook’s 
own system). The court pointed out that a platform provider may 
not specify a required form for sending a notice, and that the only 
relevant factor was whether or not a notice was received. During 
the period between receipt of the notice and the removal of the 
infringing content (as it was removed eventually), Facebook was 
committing a violation.92 
In addition to enabling their users to express their opinions, 
social media platforms also provide employers with means of 
controlling their employees. When an employer believes that a 
published opinion about it is harmful to its interests, it may 
impose a sanction on the employee who expressed this opinion. 
This is exactly what happened in Bland v Roberts.93 It appears 
from UK case law that the freedom of speech of employees is 
afforded extensive protection, as an opinion presented regarding a 
private or public matter may not be followed by sanctions where it 
did not violate the interests of the employer. 
That is the situation, for example, where an opinion remains 
within the protected boundaries of free speech and it may not be 
 
 91 CG v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., [2016] NICA 54 (N. Ir.). 
 92 Lorna Woods, When is Facebook liable for illegal content under the E-commerce 
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 93 See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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considered the employer’s opinion or an “official” position 
published in its name and on its behalf.94 In the context of U.S. 
law, Cara Magatelli argued that employees are free to pursue any 
kind of activity outside work as long as such activities are not 
illegal and do not violate the legitimate business interests of their 
employer.95 Other rules apply when Facebook is used during 
working hours, but in such cases any possible sanctions are not 
based on the content of a message but on the misuse of working 
time. The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of Bărbulescu v Romania96 
found that the monitoring of an employee’s email account resulted 
in the violation of his right to respect for private life and 
correspondence within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Though this was not a case related to social media usage, the 
decision has important implications generally to employees’ online 
privacy rights at the workplace, and so it is relevant for our 
purposes. According to the ECHR, the applicant was not informed 
on the extent and the nature of the monitoring activities or the 
possibility of his employer having had access to the content of the 
communications. The Court observed that the domestic courts did 
not pay attention to the scope of the monitoring, the degree of the 
intrusion nor to whether the monitoring was justified by 
legitimate reasons. The specific aim of such strict monitoring was 
not identified, while neither the seriousness of the consequences 
for the applicant nor alternative less intrusive measures were 
examined. 
Mary-Rose Papandrea raised the interesting issue of whether 
or not an employee may communicate with others through social 
media concerning a work-related matter (as if doing so were part 
 
 94 See Smith v. Trafford Housing Trust, [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch) (Eng.). For more 
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 95 Cara Magatelli, Facebook is Not Your Friend: Protecting a Private Employee’s 
Expectation of Privacy in Social Networking Content in the Twenty-First Century 
Workplace, 6 J. OF BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW. 103 (2012). 
 96 Bărbulescu v. Romania, No. 61496/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 56 (2017). 
644 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 89:4 
of his or her job).97 This issue is particularly sensitive in the 
context of exchanges between teachers and students. If an 
employer prohibits teachers from communicating with students 
(e.g., to prevent inappropriate communication and relationships), 
the prohibition might limit the teachers’ freedom of speech, even 
in situations where they wish to discuss a non-educational matter 
with a student. 
Naturally, the freedom of speech may be restricted in 
justified cases, but only if doing so satisfies the appropriate laws 
and tests.98 Regulating the use of social media is a possibility, and 
is an established practice in some work communities; furthermore, 
it does not seem to be an objectionable one where the legitimate 
interests of an employer require the regulation of those activities 
of its workers in situations where their posts and tweets could be 
regarded as the opinion of the employer. 
This is why the New York Times introduced guidelines for the 
use of social media by its journalists.99 It may seem ironic that the 
social media presence of journalists working for a traditional 
medium is subject to such regulation, but the reasons for 
regulation can easily be appreciated. As is also admitted by the 
journalists themselves, whatever they publish, even as a private 
individual, might be construed as the position of the paper which 
they work for. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems hard to dispute that search engines should be 
considered “editors”. This position is supported by: (1) the 
preliminary and self-regulatory filtering of content that could 
offend users (pornography, violence etc.); (2) the role search 
engines play in the removal of links to content violating 
copyrights, personality rights or other rights, and (3) the 
possibility of manipulating their search results in their own or 
someone else’s interest. However, such activities should not be 
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confused, as the activities mentioned in points (1) and (3) are 
conducted by a search engine at its own initiative, while the 
activities mentioned in point (2) are required by the government. 
Even though all of these activities are similar, in that each of 
them represents a deviation from the mission of the search engine, 
the compilation of search rankings that are most relevant to users 
is influenced by external considerations. This is a kind of editorial 
activity, which, coupled with the special role search engines play 
in the online public sphere, makes search engines highly 
influential entities that cannot be considered passive at all. 
The advent of social media platforms has brought about 
fundamental changes in the structure of the public sphere, the 
communication of opinions, the range of means of accessing 
information and the rules pertaining to the freedom of speech. It is 
a significant fact that all of the most influential platforms operate 
out of the U.S., and their owners, executives and developers follow 
an approach toward the freedom of speech that is deeply rooted in 
the principles and doctrines of the First Amendment. 
It is also noteworthy that the major platforms have a global 
presence, meaning that they have significant numbers of users in 
many different countries and that the rules of multiple 
jurisdictions can be applied to the content they make available. As 
a result, the functioning of these platforms is influenced by a 
number of different approaches toward the freedom of speech. 
These circumstances have various and sometimes contradictory 
consequences. On the one hand, the platforms sometimes try to 
make the First Amendment the law of the entire world. On the 
other hand, the platforms limit free speech much more strictly 
upon government request than they normally do in the U.S., 
merely to maintain a comfortable “safe space” for users and to 
ensure a peaceful business environment. U.S.-based global 
companies, which are used by countless U.S. citizens for daily 
communication and exchange, are also subject to European free 
speech rules and regulations that follow a different tradition.100 
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